Fuller’s Last Year (2015) Predictions— Part 2
Prediction on Turkey: (I was considerably off base on this one)
2015 Prediction:President Erdoğan in Turkey will find his influence beginning to crumble in 2015. After a brilliant prime-ministership for the first decade of AKP power, he has become mired in corruption charges and has lashed out in paranoid fashion against any and all who criticize or oppose his increasingly irrational, high-handed, and quixotic style of rule. He is in the process of damaging institutions and destroying his and his party’s legacy. I continue to have faith that Turkey’s broader institutions, however weakened by Erdoğan, will nonetheless suffice to keep the country on a basically democratic and non-violent track until such time as Erdoğan loses public confidence—which could be sooner rather than later.
2016 Assessment: Instead of politically declining as I believed he would, Erdoğan went on to hold on a plurality in the June 2015 elections—and, dissatisfied with that, quickly maneuvered to call for yet new elections in November in which he managed to win back enough of a majority to enable him to form a single party government. I did not anticipate. In the process Erdoğan increased intimidation of his opponents, and went on to arrest or detain large numbers of journalists, close down newspapers, and to manipulate and pressure the judiciary. He continues to act on the assumption that an electoral majority has given him carte blanche to rule arbitrarily with virtually no obligations of consultation with the rest of the political spectrum.
Most dangerously, after having done more to resolve the Kurdish situation than any other Turkish leader in the past decade, faced with an uncertain electorate this time he went on to create an atmosphere of insecurity in the country, and stepped up confrontation with the armed Kurdish movement inside Turkey (PKK); this policy of fear mongering led to an increase in terrorist acts and stirred increased domestic anxiety that strengthened his party at the November polls.
Erdoğan meanwhile still persists in following his ruinous and failing quest to overthrow the Asad government in Syria, even as both Washington and the EU are retreating from that policy, finally coming to understand that a victory by opposition jihadi forces in Syria poses greater dangers than the continued rule of Asad. In his zeal, Erdoğan had been willing to indiscriminately support (directly or indirectly) all armed opposition against Asad, including elements of al-Qaeda and ISIS.
Russia’s arrival on the Syrian scene with military power proved to be a major turning point in the Syrian civil war. Moscow has used its air power to take on all armed opposition in a campaign that has essentially rescued the Asad regime.In doing so, Putin has left Erdoğan’s strategy in tatters and dealt a major blow to Turkish influence on all fronts within Syria. In recently shooting down an errant Russian fighter aircraft on the Turkish border, Erdoğan unleashed a sharp diplomatic and economic riposte from Russia in which he will inevitably emerge the loser. Flailing around in desperation for alternative tactical measures, he has had to defer more to US concerns (for the moment), even seeks a nominal rapprochement with Israel (to please Washington), and aligned himself with Saudi Arabia’s essentially meaningless new “counter-terrorist” coalition of 34 countries. His relations with Iraq and Iran have seriously deteriorated. Thus, although Erdoğan has managed to gain domination over the policies of the Turkish state, it has been marked by poor judgment and dangerous tactics.
Mr. Erdoğan, you have reversed nearly all the successful foreign policy principles you innovated in your first ten years of office; would you go back to them please?
I’m going to go out on limb and say that Erdoğan’s losing game will increasingly undermine his authority, but not his power, over the next year. When the Turkish electorate will decide that he is a danger to the country is unpredictable, but his party is not up for reelection until 2019. If he continues to seek to amass power and rule in arbitrary and quixotic fashion, the damage to Turkish institutions could be grave.
Internal tensions in Turkey will rise, demonstrations and movements against him will increase. He will not lose power, but growing autocracy and heavy handed treatment of all opposition is rapidly destroying his legacy and guarantees Turkey a very tense years to come. At this point he is virtually without foreign allies, except perhaps Saudi Arabia and Qatar who may be able to provide some investment support, but little political support.
My 2015 Prediction on Iran: The role of Iran as an actor in the region will grow. Despite all the hurdles, I feel optimistic about US negotiations with Iran. Both parties desperately need success in this regard. Normalization is ludicrously long overdue and necessary to the regional order. Furthermore, Iran and Turkey, are the only two “real” governments in the region today with genuine governance based on some kind of popular legitimacy—for all their faults. Turkey is democratic, Iran semi-democratic (presidential and parliamentary elections are real, while not fully fair, but they really matter.) These two states espouse many of the aspirations of the people of the region in ways no Arab leader does. The Gulf will be forced to accommodate itself to the reality of a normalized Iran; the two sides have never really been to war, despite all the occasional bellicose noises that have emerge from them periodically over the past century. Iran is post-revolutionary power with a vision of a truly sovereign Middle East free of western domination– none of the Arab states truly are. Iran’s influence in the region will also grow in supporting growing regional challenges to Israel’s efforts to keep the Palestinians under permanent domination.
My 2016 Assessment: US-Iran relations indeed did take a stunning step forward this year with the signing of the international nuclear agreement with Iran under US leadership— Obama’s virtually sole (but impressive) success in the Middle East arena in eight years.
Rear guard actions are underway by hard-line conservatives in both the US and Iran to destroy the agreement—their ideological fervor mirror each other. Israel and its Israel-firster allies in the US are equally committed to undermining the agreement. My guess, however, is that these reactionary Iranian and American elements will not succeed in reversing the treaty, but they will set up lots of roadblocks complicating its implementation. There is still much room for military incidents in the Gulf, but as long as Obama is president such incidents will likely be handled with restraint. (There are no guarantees on this score with any next US president.)
Saddest of all, opposition to the treaty essentially undermines the prospect of more serious (and potentially valuable) cooperation between the US and Iran in other areas. Cooperation in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria will thus be harder to attain. But the treaty will hold and gradually take on greater significance and importance. It has already shifted the balance of power in the region in unpredictable directions.
The Gulf states led by Saudi Arabia of course loathe the return of Iran to a significant role in the region, but they will not publicly or explicitly oppose the treaty. In fact, they are condemned to live with it—as they have accommodated themselves countless times in the past to Gulf realities. (More on Saudi Arabia next time.)
The conservative establishment in Iran, while seeking the lifting of the sanctions, are determined to hold the line against any additional cooperation or warming of relations with the US, and to crack down against social and ideological looseness in Iran. These efforts to maintain the status quo will continue, but in the end they are a losing game: the new political and economic emergence of Iran will inexorably begin to weaken the hard liners and their control over the life of the nation. They indeed sense such trends, hence the struggle to freeze the internal scene. It’s not about nukes but about maintenance of conservative clerical domination of the nation.
Graham E. Fuller is a former senior CIA official, author of numerous books on the Muslim World; his latest book is “Breaking Faith: A novel of espionage and an American’s crisis of conscience in Pakistan.” (Amazon, Kindle) grahamefuller.com
Assessment of Fuller’s Last Year (2015) Predictions— Part 2
January 11, 2016 by Graham E. Fuller • Blog • Tags: Erdogan, Graham Fuller, Iran, ISIS, Russia, Syria, Turkey •
Fuller’s Last Year (2015) Predictions— Part 2
Prediction on Turkey: (I was considerably off base on this one)
2015 Prediction:President Erdoğan in Turkey will find his influence beginning to crumble in 2015. After a brilliant prime-ministership for the first decade of AKP power, he has become mired in corruption charges and has lashed out in paranoid fashion against any and all who criticize or oppose his increasingly irrational, high-handed, and quixotic style of rule. He is in the process of damaging institutions and destroying his and his party’s legacy. I continue to have faith that Turkey’s broader institutions, however weakened by Erdoğan, will nonetheless suffice to keep the country on a basically democratic and non-violent track until such time as Erdoğan loses public confidence—which could be sooner rather than later.
2016 Assessment: Instead of politically declining as I believed he would, Erdoğan went on to hold on a plurality in the June 2015 elections—and, dissatisfied with that, quickly maneuvered to call for yet new elections in November in which he managed to win back enough of a majority to enable him to form a single party government. I did not anticipate. In the process Erdoğan increased intimidation of his opponents, and went on to arrest or detain large numbers of journalists, close down newspapers, and to manipulate and pressure the judiciary. He continues to act on the assumption that an electoral majority has given him carte blanche to rule arbitrarily with virtually no obligations of consultation with the rest of the political spectrum.
Most dangerously, after having done more to resolve the Kurdish situation than any other Turkish leader in the past decade, faced with an uncertain electorate this time he went on to create an atmosphere of insecurity in the country, and stepped up confrontation with the armed Kurdish movement inside Turkey (PKK); this policy of fear mongering led to an increase in terrorist acts and stirred increased domestic anxiety that strengthened his party at the November polls.
Erdoğan meanwhile still persists in following his ruinous and failing quest to overthrow the Asad government in Syria, even as both Washington and the EU are retreating from that policy, finally coming to understand that a victory by opposition jihadi forces in Syria poses greater dangers than the continued rule of Asad. In his zeal, Erdoğan had been willing to indiscriminately support (directly or indirectly) all armed opposition against Asad, including elements of al-Qaeda and ISIS.
Russia’s arrival on the Syrian scene with military power proved to be a major turning point in the Syrian civil war. Moscow has used its air power to take on all armed opposition in a campaign that has essentially rescued the Asad regime.In doing so, Putin has left Erdoğan’s strategy in tatters and dealt a major blow to Turkish influence on all fronts within Syria. In recently shooting down an errant Russian fighter aircraft on the Turkish border, Erdoğan unleashed a sharp diplomatic and economic riposte from Russia in which he will inevitably emerge the loser. Flailing around in desperation for alternative tactical measures, he has had to defer more to US concerns (for the moment), even seeks a nominal rapprochement with Israel (to please Washington), and aligned himself with Saudi Arabia’s essentially meaningless new “counter-terrorist” coalition of 34 countries. His relations with Iraq and Iran have seriously deteriorated. Thus, although Erdoğan has managed to gain domination over the policies of the Turkish state, it has been marked by poor judgment and dangerous tactics.
Mr. Erdoğan, you have reversed nearly all the successful foreign policy principles you innovated in your first ten years of office; would you go back to them please?
I’m going to go out on limb and say that Erdoğan’s losing game will increasingly undermine his authority, but not his power, over the next year. When the Turkish electorate will decide that he is a danger to the country is unpredictable, but his party is not up for reelection until 2019. If he continues to seek to amass power and rule in arbitrary and quixotic fashion, the damage to Turkish institutions could be grave.
Internal tensions in Turkey will rise, demonstrations and movements against him will increase. He will not lose power, but growing autocracy and heavy handed treatment of all opposition is rapidly destroying his legacy and guarantees Turkey a very tense years to come. At this point he is virtually without foreign allies, except perhaps Saudi Arabia and Qatar who may be able to provide some investment support, but little political support.
My 2015 Prediction on Iran: The role of Iran as an actor in the region will grow. Despite all the hurdles, I feel optimistic about US negotiations with Iran. Both parties desperately need success in this regard. Normalization is ludicrously long overdue and necessary to the regional order. Furthermore, Iran and Turkey, are the only two “real” governments in the region today with genuine governance based on some kind of popular legitimacy—for all their faults. Turkey is democratic, Iran semi-democratic (presidential and parliamentary elections are real, while not fully fair, but they really matter.) These two states espouse many of the aspirations of the people of the region in ways no Arab leader does. The Gulf will be forced to accommodate itself to the reality of a normalized Iran; the two sides have never really been to war, despite all the occasional bellicose noises that have emerge from them periodically over the past century. Iran is post-revolutionary power with a vision of a truly sovereign Middle East free of western domination– none of the Arab states truly are. Iran’s influence in the region will also grow in supporting growing regional challenges to Israel’s efforts to keep the Palestinians under permanent domination.
My 2016 Assessment: US-Iran relations indeed did take a stunning step forward this year with the signing of the international nuclear agreement with Iran under US leadership— Obama’s virtually sole (but impressive) success in the Middle East arena in eight years.
Rear guard actions are underway by hard-line conservatives in both the US and Iran to destroy the agreement—their ideological fervor mirror each other. Israel and its Israel-firster allies in the US are equally committed to undermining the agreement. My guess, however, is that these reactionary Iranian and American elements will not succeed in reversing the treaty, but they will set up lots of roadblocks complicating its implementation. There is still much room for military incidents in the Gulf, but as long as Obama is president such incidents will likely be handled with restraint. (There are no guarantees on this score with any next US president.)
Saddest of all, opposition to the treaty essentially undermines the prospect of more serious (and potentially valuable) cooperation between the US and Iran in other areas. Cooperation in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria will thus be harder to attain. But the treaty will hold and gradually take on greater significance and importance. It has already shifted the balance of power in the region in unpredictable directions.
The Gulf states led by Saudi Arabia of course loathe the return of Iran to a significant role in the region, but they will not publicly or explicitly oppose the treaty. In fact, they are condemned to live with it—as they have accommodated themselves countless times in the past to Gulf realities. (More on Saudi Arabia next time.)
The conservative establishment in Iran, while seeking the lifting of the sanctions, are determined to hold the line against any additional cooperation or warming of relations with the US, and to crack down against social and ideological looseness in Iran. These efforts to maintain the status quo will continue, but in the end they are a losing game: the new political and economic emergence of Iran will inexorably begin to weaken the hard liners and their control over the life of the nation. They indeed sense such trends, hence the struggle to freeze the internal scene. It’s not about nukes but about maintenance of conservative clerical domination of the nation.
Graham E. Fuller is a former senior CIA official, author of numerous books on the Muslim World; his latest book is “Breaking Faith: A novel of espionage and an American’s crisis of conscience in Pakistan.” (Amazon, Kindle) grahamefuller.com